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Abstract
Safety is an important element of dependability. It is
defined as the absence of accidents. Most accidents involv-
ing software-intensive systems have been system accidents,
which are caused by unsafe inter-system or inter-component
interactions. To validate the absence of system hazards
concerning dysfunctional interactions, industrials call for
approaches of modeling system safety requirements and
interaction constraints among components. This paper pro-
poses such a formalism, namely interface control systems (or
shortly C-Systems). An interface C-System is composed of
an interface automaton and a controlling automaton, which
formalizes safe interactions and restricts system behavior at
the meta level. This framework differs from the framework of
traditional model checking. It explicitly separates the tasks
of product engineers and safety engineers, and provides
a top-down technique for modeling a system with safety
constraints, and for automatically composing a safe system
that conforms to safety requirements. The contributions of
this work include formalizing safety requirements and a way
of automatically ensuring system safety.
1. System Safety Requirements
Critical systems are always controlled by software appli-
cations, which overcome the shortcomings of human control,
but also introduce new failure modes that are changing the
nature of accidents [1]. Inter-system and inter-component
dependability are becoming important, since industrials are
developing complicated software-intensive systems which
consist of numerous components (subsystems) and a huge
number of actions (both internal and interactive). A recent
challenge of dependability is the system accident, caused by
increasing inter-system and inter-component couplings and
their interactive complexity [2][3]. In contrast, accidents aris-
ing from component failures are termed component failure
accidents.
System safety and component reliability are different
elements of dependability. They are system property and
component property, respectively [2]. Reliability is defined
as the capability that a component satisfies its specified
Figure 1. A Chemical Reactor Design
behavioral requirements, whereas safety is defined as the ab-
sence of accidents — events involving an unacceptable loss
[4]. People are now constructing intellectually unmanageable
software systems that go beyond human cognitive limits.
This allows potentially unsafe interactions to be undetected.
Accidents often result from hazardous interactions among
perfectly functioning components.
As an example, a system accident occurred in a batch
chemical reactor in England [5]. The design of the system
is shown in Fig. 1. The computer controlled the input flow
of cooling water into the condenser and the input flow of
catalyst into the reactor by manipulating the valves. The
computer was told that if any component in the plant gets
abnormal, it had to leave all controlled variables as they were
and to sound an alarm. On one occasion, the computer just
started to increase the cooling water flow, after a catalyst had
been added into the reactor. Then the computer received an
abnormal signal indicating a low oil level in a gearbox, and
it reacted as its requirements specified: sounded an alarm
and maintained all the control variables with their present
condition. Since the water flow was kept at a low rate, then
the reactor overheated, the relief valve lifted and the contents
of the reactor were discharged into the atmosphere.
Some other system accidents in avionics are also due
to uncontrolled interactions between components [6]. The
self-destructing explosion of Ariane 5 launcher was resulted
from the successive failures of the active Inertial Reference
System (IRS) and the backup IRS [6]. Ariane 5 adopted the
same reference system as Ariane 4. However, the profile
of Ariane 5 was different from that of Ariane 4 — the
acceleration communicated as input value to IRS of Ariane
5 was higher. Furthermore, the interactions between IRS and
other components were not redefined and checked. Due to
the overflow of input value computation, the IRS stopped
working [7]. Then, the signaled error was interpreted as a
launcher attitude, and led the control system to rotate the
tailpipe at the end stop [8].
In these accidents, the components are reliable in terms of
satisfying their specified requirements, but the systems are
not safe as a whole. Since most software related accidents
have been system accidents [1], people need to model and
constrain interactions of system components to validate the
absence of dysfunctional interactions. As Leveson men-
tioned in STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and
Processes) [1], these accidents result from inadequate control
or enforcement of safety-related constraints of the systems.
Traditionally, in order to validate the absence of sys-
tem hazards, industrials identify system safety requirements
[9][10], and use model checking to verify if system behav-
iors conform to safety requirements [11].
In this paper, we will consider safety requirements as
control structures that restrict system behaviors at meta-
model level. That is, the two models of a system and its
safety constraints will be developed at the same time. Then
the two models are “combined” to deduce a safe system.
This paper is organized as follows: the architecture of our
approach is presented in Section 2. To illustrate the idea,
a preliminary introduction on interface automata appears
in Section 3. The interface C-System based on controlling
automata is introduced in Sections 4 and 5, where examples
are used to illustrate how to formalize safety rules and
combine them with a system specification. In Section 6, we
compare our work to classic verification techniques, such as
model checking, and conclude the paper.
2. The Architecture of our Methodology
The most popular technique of system safety verification
is model checking [12]. Hundreds of checking patterns are
collected for system engineers [13] and specific uses in
safety engineering [11]. In this framework, we have three
steps in verifying a system. At first, we formalize system
behavior as a model (e.g., a finite-state transition system, a
Kripke model [14]). At the second step, we specify the safety
constraints that we aim at validating using temporal logics
[13]. At the third step, a certain checking algorithm is used
to search for a counterexample which is an execution trace
violating the specified features. If the algorithm finds such
a counterexample, we have to modify the original design to
ensure safety constraints.
Unlike model checking, our architecture takes another
way. It consists of the following steps:
(1) Modeling system behavior, including specifications of
its components, internal and external interactions, e.g., using
interface automata.
(2) Modeling system safety constraints using a certain
formal technique, e.g., controlling automata in this paper.
(3) Combining these two models to deduce a safe sys-
tem model, that is, a system model whose behavior is in
accordance with its safety constraints.
As [15] mentioned, system behavior specifies an opera-
tional semantics, which defines what a system is able to do.
System behavior modeling is achieved by product engineers
(designers), such as programmers and developers. In the
example of the chemical reactor control system, the actions
“opening the catalyst flow”, “opening the cooling water
flow” and “sounding an alarm” are actions of the system
behavior.
In the second step, the model of safety constraints spec-
ifies a correctness semantics, which defines what a system
is authorized to do. This process is the duty of safety engi-
neers whose responsibility is to assure system safety. Safety
engineers may consist of requirement engineers, testing
engineers, managers from higher socio-technical levels who
define safety standards or regulations [1], etc. In the example
of the chemical reactor system, the constraint “opening the
catalyst flow must be followed by opening the cooling water
flow” is an instance of system safety constraints.
In the third step, in order to ensure system safety, we
combine a system model with its safety constraints model.
Then we ensure that the system is safe under the constraints
specifying safety requirements. A precondition of this ap-
proach is that we must formalize safety requirements. And
we also need to carefully define the composition of a system
model and its constraints model. We will introduce such
means based on controlling automata.
3. Preliminary: Interface Automata
To model component-based concurrent systems with dif-
ferent input, output and internal actions, the theory of inter-
face automata [16] extends Input/Output automata [17][18],
which extends classic automata theory [19].
Unlike I/O automata, an interface automaton is not re-
quired to be input-enabled (i.e., some inputs may be rec-
ognized as illegal in some states) and only allows the
composition of two automata (I/O automata allow the com-
position of infinite automata), and a synchronization of one
output and one input action results a hidden action after the
composition.
Definition 1: An interface automaton (simply an au-
tomaton) is a tuple A = (Q,ΣI ,ΣO,ΣH , δ, S), where:
(1) Q is a set of states.
(2) ΣI ,ΣO,ΣH are pairwise disjoint sets of input, output
and internal actions, respectively. Let Σ = ΣI
⋃
ΣO
⋃
ΣH
be the set of actions.
(3) δ ⊆ Q× Σ×Q is a set of labeled transitions.
(4) S ⊆ Q is a set of start states, where |S| ≤ 1. 
In the graph notation, a transition pk : (q, a, q′) ∈ δ
is denoted by an arc from q to q′ labeled pk : a, where
pk is the name of the transition. To discriminate explicitly
the different sets of actions in diagrams, we may suffix a
symbol “?”, “!” or “;” to an input, output or internal action,
respectively.
The composition of two composable automata allows
the automata to synchronize on shared actions, and asyn-
chronously interleave all other actions.
Definition 2: Two interface automata A and B are com-
posable if ΣHA ∩ ΣB = ∅, ΣIA ∩ ΣIB = ∅, ΣOA ∩ ΣOB = ∅,
ΣHB ∩ ΣA = ∅. We let shared(A,B) = ΣA ∩ ΣB . 
Definition 3: If A and B are composable interface au-
tomata, their product A ⊗ B is the interface automaton
defined by
(1) QA⊗B = QA ×QB
(2) ΣIA⊗B = (ΣIA ∪ ΣIB)− shared(A,B)
(3) ΣOA⊗B = (ΣOA ∪ΣOB)− shared(A,B)
(4) ΣHA⊗B = ΣHA ∪ ΣHB ∪ shared(A,B)
(5)
δA⊗B = { pi : ((v, u), a, (v′, u)) | pi : (v, a, v′) ∈ δA
∧a 6∈ shared(A,B) ∧ u ∈ QB}
∪ {pj : ((v, u), a, (v, u′)) | pj : (u, a, u′) ∈ δB
∧a 6∈ shared(A,B) ∧ v ∈ QA}
∪ {pij : ((v, u), a, (v′, u′)) | pi : (v, a, v′) ∈ δA
∧pj : (u, a, u′) ∈ δB ∧ a ∈ shared(A,B)}
(6) SA⊗B = SA × SB . 
Note that the name of the transition pij of A ⊗ B may
contain the names of two original transitions pi ∈ δA and
pj ∈ δB .
In the product A⊗B, there may be illegal states, where
one component is able to send an output a ∈ shared(A,B)
and the other is not able to receive a.
The composition of two interface automata A,B is ob-
tained by restricting the product of the two automata to the
set Cmp(A,B) of compatible states, which are the states
from which there exists a legal environment that can prevent
entering illegal states.
Definition 4: If A and B are composable interface au-
tomata, their composition A||B is the interface automaton
defined by
(1) QA||B = Cmp(A,B)
(2) ΣI
A||B = Σ
I
A⊗B
(3) ΣO
A||B = Σ
O
A⊗B
(4) ΣH
A||B = Σ
H
A⊗B
(5) δA||B = δA⊗B ∩ (Cmp(A,B) × ΣA||B × Cmp(A,B))
(6) SA||B = SA⊗B ∩ Cmp(A,B). 
4. Safety Constraints on a Single Component
In this section, we start from a simple case – modeling
safety constraints on a single component. In the example
of the batch chemical reactor (C.f. Fig. 1), the computer
system behavior is modeled using an interface automaton
A of Fig. 2(1). The automaton A includes a set of input
actions ΣI = {l} (low oil signal), a set of output actions
ΣO = {c, w, a} (opening catalyst flow, opening water flow,
sounding an alarm, respectively), and a set of internal actions
ΣH = {e} (ending all operations).
The normal operational behavior includes opening the
catalyst flow (p1), then opening the water flow (p2), etc., re-
sulting in an infinite execution trace p1p2p1p2.... To respond
to abnormal signals as soon as possible, the states q0, q1 both
have a transition labeled l, which leads to a state that can
sound an alarm (p5) and stop the process (p6). Unfortunately,
this design leads to hazardous behaviors: (cw)∗clae, that is,
after a sequence of opening catalyst and water flows (cw)∗,
then the catalyst flow is opened (c) when an abnormal signal
is received (l), then an alarm is sounded (a). So water is not
added after the catalyst flow is opened. This sequence of
events leads to the accident mentioned in Section 1.
Note that this hazard is due to the uncontrolled sequences
of transitions — p1 must be followed by p2 and not by p4.
To solve this problem, we need to specify the authorized
sequences (satisfying safety constraints) on the transitions
δ and not on the actions Σ. Thus, these constraints are
not at the behavioral model level, but at the meta-model
level. We propose the concept of controlling automata to
formalize safety constraints. Then, we combine a controlling
automaton with the system automaton.
Definition 5: A controlling automaton Aˆ over an inter-
face automaton A = (Q,Σ, δ, S) is a tuple Aˆ = (Qˆ, Σˆ, δˆ, Sˆ),
where:
(1) Qˆ is a set of states disjoint with Q.
(2) Σˆ is a set of terminals, such that Σˆ = δ.
(3) δˆ ⊆ Qˆ× Σˆ× Qˆ is a set of labeled transitions.
(4) Sˆ ⊆ Qˆ is a nonempty set of start states. 
Note that the transitions δ of A are terminals of Aˆ, so we
say that Aˆ is at the meta level of A. Figure 3 illustrates the 3
levels in our framework. Let Σ∗ be a set of execution traces
of actions, A describes the behavior on Σ. Aˆ specifies the
behavior on the A-transitions (Σˆ = δ), that is, a behavior
on the behavior of A. This meta-behavior expresses safety
requirements.
In the example, to prevent accidents, we need to impose
the safety constraint “opening catalyst must be followed by
opening water,” that is, “whenever the transition p1 : c
occurs, the transition p2 : w must occur after that”. This
constraint can be formalized as a controlling automaton Aˆ
of Fig. 2(2). When we express this constraint, we only
specify the sequence of transitions p1, p2 at the meta-model
level, and we concern little about the implementation of
q0
q1
q2 q3 q4p1 : c!p2 : w!
p3 : l?
p4 : l?
p5 : a! p6 : e;
(1)A
qˆ0 qˆ1
{pi}2≤i≤6
p1
p2
(2)Aˆ
Figure 2. Automata of the Reactor Control System
Σ∗
Σ
A
δ
Aˆ
C
(execution traces)
Level L1
(functional requirements)
Level L2
(safety requirements)
Level L3
Figure 3. A 3-levels Overview
the system at the model level. The next step is to compose
the system automaton A with its controlling automaton Aˆ,
and automatically generate a system C satisfying the safety
requirement.
Definition 6: The meta-composition C of an interface
automaton A = (Q,Σ, δ, S) and a controlling automaton
Aˆ = (Qˆ, Σˆ, δˆ, Sˆ) over A is a tuple:
C = A−→· Aˆ = (Q× Qˆ,Σ, δ′, S × Sˆ) (1)
where pk : ((qi, qˆj), a, (qm, qˆn)) ∈ δ′ iff,
(1) pk : (qi, a, qm) ∈ δ, and
(2) (qˆj , pk, qˆn) ∈ δˆ.
We say that A and Aˆ constitute an interface control
system (or simply interface C-System). 
The symbol −→· is called meta-composition operator, and
read “meta-compose”. Its left and right operands are an
automaton and a controlling automaton, respectively. No-
tice that an interface C-System is equivalent to the meta-
composition C of an interface automaton and a controlling
automaton.
Notice that δ = {pk}k∈K plays a key role in associating
transitions of A and terminals of Aˆ. For our example, we
combine the automata A and Aˆ of Fig. 2, thus we get the
automaton C = A−→· Aˆ of Fig. 4 where qij denotes (qi, qˆj).
The meta-composition contains exactly all the paths satis-
fying the safety constraint. Formally, we have the following
theorem (the proof is omitted for its simpleness and intu-
itiveness from the definition):
Theorem 7: Given A, Aˆ and the meta-composition C,
an execution trace tΣ ∈ Σ∗ is recognized by C iff, tΣ
q00
q11
q20 q30 q40p1 : c!p2 : w!
p3 : l?
p5 : a! p6 : e;
Figure 4. The Meta-Composition C
is recognized by A, and its transition trace tδ ∈ δ∗ is
recognized by Aˆ. 
Obviously, the set of traces of C is a subset of the traces
of A. Formally, let L(A) be the set of traces of A (i.e. the
language of A), we have L(C) ⊆ L(A).
Thanks to Aˆ, the hazardous execution traces, for example
cwclae, which exists in A, will be eliminated, because its
transition trace p1p2p1p4p5p6 6∈ L(Aˆ) (the language of Aˆ).
The comparison between A of Fig. 2(1) and C of Fig. 4
highlights the hazardous transition p4 of A. However, in
general, this diagnosis is much more complex and cannot
be achieved manually, since a real system A has too many
states to be expressed clearly on a paper. That is why we
developed a formal and automated method for eliminating
hazardous transitions.
5. Safety Constraints on Multi-Components
To illustrate this case, we use an example concerning
a system composed of two components with interactions:
a candy vending machine and a customer. We hope that,
since this class of examples is so popular in the literatures
of formal methods (e.g., Hoare’s Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP) and I/O automata [17]), they will provide an
interesting illustration of our idea. The candy machine Am,
specified in Fig. 5(1), may receive inputs b1, b2 indicating
that buttons 1 and 2 are pushed, respectively. It may output
s, a, indicating candy dispensation actions, SKYBARs and
ALMONDJOYs, respectively. The machine may receive
several inputs before delivering a candy. A greedy user Au,
specified in Fig. 5(2), can push buttons b1, b2 or get a candy
s, a. The greedy user does not wait for a candy bar before
pressing a button again.
The composition of the machine behavior and the user
behavior is defined by Amu = Am||Au of Fig. 5(3), where
qij denotes the composite state (mi, uj), pi,j denotes two
synchronized transitions {pi, pj}. A transition of the compo-
sition may be composed of two transitions of components.
For example, p1,13 : s is a synchronization of p1 : s!
and p13 : s?, which belong to Am and Au, respectively.
Generally, a transition of A = P ||Q may be composed
of one or two transitions of its components, where two
transitions constitute a synchronization.
In the context of meta-composition, a composite transition
is allowed if and only if both of its sub-transitions are
allowed by its controlling automaton. Thus, we define the
meta-composition operator as follows:
Definition 8: The meta-composition (or interface C-
System) C of a composition A = P ||Q and a controlling
automaton Aˆ = (Qˆ, Σˆ, δˆ, Sˆ) over A is a tuple:
C = A−→· Aˆ = (QA × Qˆ,ΣA, δ
′, SA × Sˆ) (2)
where pI : ((v, u, q), a, (v′, u′, q′)) ∈ δ′ (pI contains a set
of transitions {pk}k∈I ) iff,
(1) pI : (((v, u), a, (v′, u′)) ∈ δA, and
(2) ∀k : k ∈ I • (q, pk, q′) ∈ δˆ. 
Notice that the specification of the example allows a
hazardous situation: the greedy user repeatedly pushes the
buttons without giving the machine a chance to dispense a
candy bar (e.g., the transition labeled p5,11 : b1 of q11 does
not allow the transition (q11, s, q00) to be fired). To prevent
this situation, the following constraints forbid successive
occurrences of pressing buttons: “the transitions p11, p12 are
not allowed, when interactions occur between the machine
and the user”. Differing from the previous example, this
type of constraints needs to synchronize the actions of the
machine and of the user.
Formalizing the constraints, the semantics of the control-
ling automaton Ac of Fig. 6(1) is: whenever the user pushes
a button (p9, p10), she or he cannot push it again (p11, p12),
but can only wait for a candy bar.
Combining the whole system Amu with its constraint
Ac, we get the system C = (Am||Au)−→· Ac in Fig. 6(2),
where qijk denotes the composite state (mi, uj, ck). All of
its execution traces satisfy the constraint, and thus prevent
the hazardous situation.
Since we formally defined the meta-composition operator,
it can be easily implemented to be an automated tool. Thus,
it can be applied to more complex systems.
6. Conclusion
We proposed formalizing system safety requirements us-
ing controlling automata. As we illustrated using examples,
this approach can formally model safe interactions between
components or systems. This framework differs from the
one of model checking. It explicitly separates the tasks
of product engineers and safety engineers, and provides a
technique for modeling a system with safety constraints, and
for automatically composing a safe system that conforms to
safety requirements.
The essential ideas of our approach are the separation
and formalization of the system specification A (core func-
tional requirements) and the safety constraints Aˆ (safety
requirements). The automaton A handles inputs to produce
outputs using activities depending on the states, whereas the
controlling automaton Aˆ treats activities to produce the set
of acceptable activities depending on safety requirements.
Our framework has different objectives and uses different
approaches to those of model checking. Model checking
techniques use a bottom-up approach — it verifies execution
traces Σ∗ at the lower level L1 to prove the correctness and
safety of the system model A at the middle level L2 (see
Fig. 3). However, our proposal uses a top-down approach
— we model safety requirements as acceptable sequences of
transitions (δ∗) at the higher level L3 to ensure the correct
use of A. Then any execution trace (at L1) that conforms to
the meta-composition C is definitely a safe execution. The
two techniques are complementary. Model checking may be
used to reduce the design fault likelihood, and our approach
can be applied to avoid behavior that are not in accordance
with some critical safety requirements.
This paper continues our work on C-Systems (formal
language control systems). In [20], we actually proposed the
input/output C-System. The context-free C-System was pro-
posed in [21] for restricting the use of modeling languages,
in order to ensure guidelines and consistency rules of UML.
In the future, it might be a good direction to study the
formalization of parameterized safety constraints. Another
direction is empirical case study on applying this formalism
in large and complex systems.
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